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ABSTRACT
Managers, security analysts, investors, and the press rely increasingly on
modified definitions of GAAP net income, known by such names as “operat-
ing” and “pro forma” earnings. We document this phenomenon and discuss
competing explanations for the recent rise in the use of such modified earn-
ings numbers and implications for the interpretation of related accounting
research. Our results show that over the past 20 years there has been a dramatic
increase in the frequency and magnitude of cases where “GAAP” and “Street”
earnings differ. Further, there is a very strong bias toward the reporting of
a Street earnings number that exceeds the GAAP earnings number. We also
show that the market response to the Street earnings number has displaced
GAAP earnings as a primary determinant of stock prices. Finally, through an
analysis of earnings releases, we show that management has taken a proactive
role in defining and emphasizing the Street number when communicating to
analysts and investors.
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1. Introduction
Since the seminal work of Ball and Brown [1968], it has been well docu-
mented that stock prices are closely related to earnings performance. Earn-
ings performance has been traditionally measured using the net income
and earnings per share (EPS) figures produced according to “generally
accepted accounting principles” (GAAP). However, recent years have wit-
nessed an increasing focus on “Street” earnings numbers, which are the
numbers announced by corporations in their press releases and tracked
by analyst estimate clearinghouse services, such as I/B/E/S, Zacks, and First
Call.
In this paper, we present evidence that a growing rift has developed be-
tween GAAP earnings numbers and Street earnings numbers. We show that
this rift has arisen because both management and the analyst tracking ser-
vices increasingly focus on Street measures of earnings, excluding a variety
of expenses required under GAAP. This rift has been exaggerated by a dra-
matic increase in the magnitude and frequency of expenses that are being
excluded from Street earnings (e.g., “special items” and “non-cash items”).
We also provide evidence that investors price the Street earnings numbers
reported by the analyst tracking services, rather than the earnings numbers
reported under GAAP. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that the in-
creased attention on the alternative definitions of earnings is driven by the
reporting strategies of firm managers.
Our results are consistent with two interpretations. First, the increased
emphasis on Street earnings may represent an attempt by managers and
analysts to garner higher valuations by reporting the higher Street earnings
numbers. While difficult to reconcile with traditional academic theories
such as the efficient market hypothesis, this interpretation is consistent with
those provided by the financial press.1 This perspective also corroborates
recent concerns raised by Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission.2 The second interpretation is that the increased
emphasis on Street earnings may represent attempts by managers and ana-
lysts to remove transitory components from earnings in order to make Street
earnings an improved measure for determining future cash flows and hence
firm value. Both analysts and academics have long focused on the identifica-
tion of permanent versus transitory components of earnings. For example,
Barnea, Ronen, and Sadan [1975] discuss extraordinary item classification
and argue that “the primary criterion is whether management, which is in
the best position to assess the recurrability of earnings, believes the item
to be transitory or persistent” (p. 63). This is the perspective advocated in
related working papers by Abarbanell and Lehavy [2000] and Brown and
1 See, for example, “Companies Use Every Trick to Pump Earnings and Fool Investors. The
Latest Abuse: ‘Pro Forma’ Reporting,” David Henry, BusinessWeek, May 14, 2001.
2 See “The Numbers Game,” by A. Levitt, unpublished remarks available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/speeches/spch220.txt.
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Sivakumar [2001]. These two interpretations are not mutually exclusive,
and given the recency of the Street earnings phenomenon, we are currently
unable to provide conclusive evidence on the relative importance of these
competing explanations.
Regardless of the interpretation of the results, our findings have a num-
ber of important implications for existing research. First, our findings are
relevant to the interpretation of recent work that documents a reduction in
the optimism of analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Matsumoto [2000], Brown [2001],
Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki [2000]). That research generally concludes
that the decline in optimism is due to management’s downward guidance
of analysts’ forecasts. Alternatively, we show that the Street earnings num-
bers tracked by analysts have been increasingly inflated by the exclusion of
a growing number of charges. The combined effect of downward guidance
of analysts’ forecasts by managers and inflation of the “actual” earnings
number reported on the analyst tracking databases translates into a de-
cline in the ex post optimism of analysts’ forecasts. In other words, there ap-
pears to have been a convergence between the numbers being forecasted by
analysts and the numbers that the databases archive as earnings, although
these alternative earnings figures differ from what has customarily been
identified as “net income” (i.e., GAAP). Thus, our findings are relevant
to any research that draws inferences based on a time-series of forecast
errors.
Second, our results also have implications for recent academic research in-
vestigating temporal trends in the value relevance of earnings (e.g., Collins,
Maydew, and Weiss [1997], Francis and Schipper [1999], Chang [1999]).
This research generally documents a decline in the association between
GAAP earnings and stock prices and concludes that there has been a de-
cline in the value relevance of earnings. In contrast, we show that there has
been a dramatic increase in the association of Street earnings with stock
prices. Thus, our results extend this line of research and suggest that the
market focuses on the modified Street definition of earnings rather than
GAAP earnings.
Finally, our results complement a number of studies that consider alter-
natives to classical earnings management (Healy and Wahlen [1999]). For
example, Schrand and Walther [2000] investigate whether managers affect
the benchmark against which current earnings are judged by strategically
“reminding” investors about transitory gains and losses. Our findings are
related, and one interpretation of them is that managers have also adopted
another subtle approach by successfully creating modified definitions of
earnings that are generally higher than GAAP earnings. This phenomenon
is related to the work on classificatory income smoothing by Barnea, Ronen,
and Sadan [1976], who argue that managers employ extraordinary items
classification to reduce over-time variation in operating income. Specifi-
cally identifying charges to be excluded from Street earnings is less restric-
tive than classificatory smoothing, however, because management need not
actually segregate in the financial statements the charges excluded.
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2. Development of Empirical Predictions
The quarterly earnings announcement season has become a closely
watched ritual. Wall Street analysts and corporate management engage in
an increasingly complex game with investors, where even small negative
earnings surprises can result in huge negative stock returns.3 As a conse-
quence, corporate managers have adopted a number of techniques to avoid
reporting negative surprises, including earnings pre-announcements and
other expectations management strategies (e.g., Kasznik and Lev [1995],
Matsumoto [2000]).
We investigate another potential technique for reporting earnings news
to investors, whereby the reported earnings are modifications of GAAP earn-
ings such that certain expenses deemed to be “non-recurring” or “non-cash”
are excluded. Sell-side analyst tracking services (i.e., First Call, I/B/E/S, and
Zacks) act as the arbiters of the magnitude of earnings surprises, and appear
to be increasingly following the lead of management and analysts in ex-
cluding ever more charges from earnings. A recent Wall Street Journal article
describes the process as follows:4
Analysts report to First Call earnings estimates based on “operating” earn-
ings, which is regular income that doesn’t include the costs for one-time
charges, for things like mergers. First Call then uses those numbers to calculate
consensus earnings estimates. But there’s a hitch. There’s no definition of op-
erating earnings in accounting rules. So companies increasingly leave out of
the so-called operating or pro forma earnings pot many more charges. These
include employee stock-based compensation and goodwill, the premium ac-
quiring companies pay over a target company’s book value.
“What companies are trying to do is entice analysts into excluding certain
charges and value them only on that basis,” Mr. Hill says. In effect, “companies
are creating their own grading systems to help ensure that, no matter how
their business is doing, they will get an A or an A+,” says accounting expert
Howard Schilit.
Examples of charges that are regularly excluded from the Street’s defini-
tion of reported earnings include restructuring charges, write-downs and
impairments, research and development expenditures, merger and acquisi-
tions costs, mandatory stock compensation expense, goodwill amortization,
and certain results of subsidiaries.5 Note the absence of revenues from this
3 See Skinner and Sloan [1999] for evidence on the asymmetry of price reactions to small
negative relative to small positive earnings surprises. Alternatively, Kinney, Burgstahler, and
Martin [2000] document that, although price reactions to negative (positive) earnings surprises
are reliably negative (positive), such reactions are not always “probable,” where they assume
probable means “a likelihood of .75 or higher.”
4 See “Varied Profit Reports by Firms Create Confusion,” by Elizabeth MacDonald, The Wall
Street Journal, August 24, 1999, p. C1.
5 In contrast to employee stock options, for which the FASB encourages but does not require
expense treatment (SFAS No. 123), firms exclude certain other stock-based charges that are
classified as expenses under GAAP such as payroll taxes on stock options, stock appreciation
rights, variable stock options, and acquisition-related costs classified as compensation, as well
as certain deferred compensation and severance arrangements.
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list.6 A case in point is Amazon, which reports “pro forma” earnings that
“exclude amortization of goodwill and other intangibles, equity in losses of
equity-method investees, stock-based compensation costs, and merger, ac-
quisition and investment-related costs,” and more recently expanded this list
to include interest expense on long-term debt.7 However, despite excluding
equity method losses, Amazon’s pro forma earnings include revenue associ-
ated with noncash transactions whereby equity-method investees exchange
equity securities for advertising and promotional services.8 Motivated by
seemingly pervasive anecdotal evidence, we seek to document the magni-
tude of the growing rift between Street earnings and GAAP earnings and to
identify some of the major causes and consequences of this rift.
The concepts of consensus earnings and earnings surprise relative to con-
sensus are relatively new, and were not pervasive on Wall Street until the early
1990s.9 The analyst tracking services have increasingly promulgated these
concepts over the past decade. By working with management and analysts
to create a new language and system for summarizing and disseminating
earnings information, the analyst tracking services have become an integral
aspect of managerial disclosure of quarterly earnings. Our basic prediction
is that the phenomenon of reporting Street rather than GAAP earnings has
become more pervasive over the last decade, along with the rise to promi-
nence of analyst tracking services. Our first prediction is:
P1: The magnitude of the difference between Street earnings as re-
ported by the analyst tracking services and GAAP earnings as re-
ported in firms’ financial statements has been growing over the last
decade.
To establish the economic significance of differences between Street and
GAAP earnings, we investigate the relative ability of forecast errors com-
puted using the two definitions of earnings to explain contemporaneous
stock returns. If either (i) investors are misled by managers’ focus on Street
earnings or (ii) expenses and charges excluded from Street earnings are
indeed transitory with no implications for future earnings, stock returns
should be more highly associated with Street-based forecast errors than
GAAP-based forecast errors. Formally stated,
P2: Stock returns are more highly associated with Street earnings than
with GAAP earnings.
6 SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner has recently referred to Street earnings as “EBS earn-
ings,” for “Everything but Bad Stuff.”
7 Company press release from Business Wire, April 26, 2000, “Amazon.com Surpasses
20 Million Cumulative Customer Accounts and Announces Financial Results for First Quarter
2000.”
8 To quantify these effects, in the first quarter of 2000, Amazon reported a Street loss of
35 cents per share versus a GAAP loss of 90 cents per share, with the Street loss “beating”
analysts’ estimates by one cent.
9 See “The Trouble with the Consensus Estimate,” Joseph Nocera, Money Magazine, June 1,
1998.
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Tests of this prediction will provide prima facie evidence as to which earn-
ings measure investors view as more value relevant. However, this test does
not provide definitive conclusions regarding the extent to which investors
should ignore expenses and charges excluded from Street earnings. Such a
test would require us to identify the future date at which investors realize
that the excess of Street earnings over GAAP earnings will not result in a cor-
responding cash flow or dividend. Given that the divergence between Street
earnings and GAAP earnings is a relatively recent phenomenon, we do not
have a long enough history to construct powerful tests of this hypothesis.
However, indirect evidence on this issue is provided in a recent working pa-
per by Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin [1999]. They demonstrate that
security prices act as if investors do not fully impound the time-series proper-
ties of negative special items, which anecdotally appear to be among charges
routinely excluded from Street earnings.
With respect to the first two predictions, we expect that the growing dif-
ference between Street earnings and GAAP earnings is attributable to both
an increase in the frequency of the type of costs excluded from Street earn-
ings and an increased tendency of the analyst tracking services to exclude
such costs from Street earnings. A large number of the charges that are
excluded from Street earnings are coded by Compustat as “special items,”
and include restructuring charges, asset impairments, merger and acquisi-
tion charges and other significant non-recurring items. There are numerous
other charges that might also be considered, such as amortization expense
and losses of certain subsidiaries. However, we wish to focus on special items
for several reasons. First, the use of special items by managers to affect market
perceptions of their performance is well established in the literature (e.g.,
Elliott and Hanna [1996], Kinney and Trezevant [1997], and others). Sec-
ond, special items are separately and consistently coded by Compustat, thus
facilitating data collection. Finally, we believe that the exclusion of the other
charges by the Street is a much more recent and selective phenomenon than
the exclusion of special items, and including them may introduce noise and
lead to a lack of power.10 Thus, we focus our predictions and tests on special
items. The third and fourth predictions follow:
P3: There has been an increase in the relative frequency of negative
special items over the past decade.
P4: There has been an increased tendency of the analyst tracking ser-
vices to report earnings before negative special items over the past
decade.
Evidence on the increasing frequency of negative special items is docu-
mented in several recent studies (e.g., Elliott and Hanna [1996]). In an
10 In supplemental tests, we use annual data and analyze other charges that seem to be
frequently excluded from Street earnings, including amortization expense, research and de-
velopment expense, and nonoperating income. These tests are discussed in the results.
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earlier paper, Philbrick and Ricks [1991] examine discrepancies between
earnings per share across several research databases during 1984–1986
(Value Line, I/B/E/S, Standard & Poor’s, Zacks, and Compustat). They find
differences across the databases and conclude that the choice of earnings
per share, rather than the choice of forecasted earnings, has a significant
impact on empirical associations between forecast errors and stock returns.
Our tests extend this evidence by examining temporal changes in the extent
to which special items are excluded from Street earnings.
Clearly, managers are responsible for the timing and amount of recorded
special items. What is unclear, however, is whether an explicit focus on Street
definitions of earnings originates with managers or analysts. Managers have
numerous incentives to report higher earnings (Healy and Wahlen [1999]),
but managers also possess inside information regarding future recurring
earnings (Barnea, Ronen, and Sadan [1975]). Both ideas are consistent
with managers having spawned the notion of Street earnings. Anecdotal
evidence also indicates managers are proactive in encouraging analysts to
exclude ever more charges from earnings. For example, Chuck Hill, First
Call’s research chief, states, “It’s snowballing—we’re seeing more and more
companies reporting their earnings in numerous different ways, and analysts
are going along with it.”11 In a recent and well-publicized example, Staples,
Inc. persuaded analysts to prepare forecasts excluding the losses from its
Staples.com division.12 Moreover, the reporting of Street versus GAAP earn-
ings seems biased to present results in a more favorable light. For example,
in 1998 Network Associates announced,
“Excluding non-recurring charges associated with acquisitions, pro forma
fully diluted earnings per share increased 64% to $.41 compared with pro
forma fully diluted earnings per share of $.25 in the second quarter of 1997.
Including non-recurring charges associated with acquisitions, reported fully
diluted earnings (loss) per share was $(.87) compared with $.25 in the same
period last year.”13
Note that “pro forma” earnings per share for the prior year were equal to
GAAP earnings per share, and moreover, that the pro forma earnings per
share suggest an upward trend in earnings versus a reversal from profitability
to losses according to the GAAP figures. Our final prediction directly links
the focus on Street earnings to managerial guidance:
P5: Over the past decade, managers have increased their emphasis on
Street definitions of earnings in their quarterly earnings announce-
ments.
11 See Elizabeth MacDonald, op. cit.
12 “No Accounting for the Net?,” by Laura Johannes, The Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2000,
p. C1.
13 PR Newswire, July 20, 1998.
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3. Data
Data used in this study are obtained from the I/B/E/S, Compustat (quar-
terly), and CRSP (daily) research tapes. We focus on quarterly earnings per
share because prior evidence demonstrates the importance of these an-
nouncements for stock prices (e.g., Skinner and Sloan [1999]) and reveals
that the incidence of write-offs and other one-time items differs across fiscal
quarters (Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin [1999]). Based on this re-
search, we anticipate that the largest differences between Street and GAAP
earnings will occur during the fourth fiscal quarter. We use I/B/E/S to obtain
the measure of earnings reported by the analyst tracking services. I/B/E/S
represents only one of the three major analyst tracking services. With respect
to the other two, we do not have Zacks data available in machine-readable
form, and First Call has a relatively short history of data, making it unsuit-
able for our tests. From I/B/E/S, we obtain forecasted quarterly earnings per
share and I/B/E/S-defined earnings per share. The sample period is 1985–
1997. We begin with 1986 because coverage on I/B/E/S is limited for earlier
years. To be consistent with the forecasts, data on stock prices for scaling are
also obtained from I/B/E/S. GAAP earnings per share, earnings announce-
ment dates, and certain accounting data (e.g., special items, total expenses,
etc.) are obtained from Compustat. Finally, common stock returns for quar-
terly earnings announcement periods (described below) are obtained from
the CRSP daily returns file.
The initial sample with complete Compustat and I/B/E/S data consists of
108,864 firm-quarter observations. The number of observations available in
each year ranges from 4,919 in 1985 to 14,179 in 1997. Within each year,
the distribution of observations is approximately equal across the four fiscal
quarters. In later tests using stock returns, the sample size is reduced to
98,647 firm-quarter observations due to missing return data on CRSP.
GAAP earnings per share from Compustat (“EPSGAAP”) reflect income be-
fore extraordinary items (quarterly data item #8) divided by the average
common shares outstanding during the quarter (data item #61) adjusted
for stock splits (data item #17). Note that this definition of earnings ex-
cludes both extraordinary items and earnings from discontinued opera-
tions, which is not bottom-line net income. We adopt income before ex-
traordinary items because the latitude available to managers in classifying
expenses and charges as “extraordinary” is restricted to a limited number of
events that qualify as unusual and infrequent. Further, including earnings
from discontinued operations and cumulative effects of accounting changes
in our GAAP earnings number would add noise to our tests without con-
tributing towards the testing of our predictions. Additionally, we know that
I/B/E/S earnings per share (“EPSStreet”) reflect a company’s earnings per
share reported on a “continued operations” basis. I/B/E/S defines this mea-
sure as follows (I/B/E/S [1996]):
“. . . I/B/E/S receives an analyst’s forecast after discontinued operations, ex-
traordinary charges, and other non-operating items have been backed out.
While this is far and away the best method for valuing a company, it often
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causes a discrepancy when a company reports earnings. I/B/E/S adjusts re-
ported earnings to match analysts’ forecasts on both an annual and quarterly
basis. This is why I/B/E/S actuals may not agree with other published actuals;
i.e., Compustat.”
Thus, like our GAAP measure of net income, the I/B/E/S definition also ex-
cludes extraordinary items and earnings from discontinued operations. But
in addition, it also excludes “other non-operating items.” Our hypotheses
predict that I/B/E/S has been more aggressively excluding such items from
their definition of earnings.
To facilitate cross-sectional analysis, we scale both earnings per share fig-
ures by stock price during the last month of the fiscal quarter. The other
key accounting variable in our analysis is special items (data item #32),
stated on an adjusted per share basis, which represents significant nonre-
curring items other than extraordinary items or discontinued operations.
This data item should capture a large fraction of the “non-operating items”
that are excluded from earnings by I/B/E/S. However, in situations where
firms include such charges within other income statement line items (e.g.,
“costs of goods sold,” “depreciation and amortization” or “other operating
expenses”) and I/B/E/S screens these amounts from their definition of earn-
ings, the I/B/E/S definition will exclude additional items. I/B/E/S may be
more active at screening out amounts that are included within other line
items because of their stated efforts to adjust reported earnings to match
analysts’ forecasts.
We define quarterly forecast errors as reported earnings minus median
consensus forecasted earnings, scaled by stock price (all data from the last
month of the fiscal quarter). We calculate two different forecast errors using
the two reported earnings per share measures, EPSGAAP and EPSStreet, and
we denote the forecast errors as FEGAAP and FEStreet.
Finally, we measure long window stock returns between earnings an-
nouncement dates. Earnings announcement dates are obtained from the
Compustat quarterly research tape. We define the long window return in-
terval as the period beginning two days after the last quarterly earnings
announcement and ending on the day after the current period earnings
announcement. This interval averages approximately 60 trading days, and
captures the effects of any earnings pre-announcements leading up to the
earnings announcement. We use this interval because prior research docu-
ments that firms with negative earnings surprises are more likely to prean-
nounce earnings and do so within two weeks of fiscal quarter end (Skinner
[1997]). Use of a shorter window may miss pre-announcements for some
firms, possibly biasing our results for firms with negative earnings surprises.
4. Results
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE
We begin by presenting descriptive evidence that highlights the overall
differences between GAAP and Street earnings over the last decade. Panels
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GAAP earnings are obtained from Compustat and are defined as earnings before extraordinary
items and discontinued operations (data item #25) divided by average common shares out-
standing (data item #61) adjusted for stock splits (data item #17). Street earnings are obtained
from I/B/E/S and reflect GAAP earnings per share adjusted for certain charges considered
by I/B/E/S to be nonrecurring. Both earnings per share numbers are scaled by stock price,
obtained from I/B/E/S as of the final month of the firm’s fiscal quarter end.
FIG. 1.—Comparative plots of quarterly cross-sectional means of earnings per share as a
percentage of stock price for street and GAAP definitions of earnings, 1985–1997.
A through D of figure 1 plot quarterly earnings scaled by stock price over the
period 1985–1997 for both EPSGAAP and EPSStreet. The plots demonstrate
the increasing disparity between these earnings per share definitions, and
differences are significant (formal statistical tests are deferred). Although
the most notable differences appear in the fourth quarter, all quarters indi-
cate at least a slight disparity between EPSGAAP and EPSStreet that has been
growing in recent years. In particular, prior to the 1990s, reported earnings
per share under the two definitions track each other reasonably well. How-
ever, beginning in the 1990s, there is a change in the relation between Street
and GAAP earnings per share.14
14 We spoke with an I/B/E/S official, who agreed that I/B/E/S indeed “stepped up” its adjust-
ments to earnings around this time, because they were concerned about providing earnings
figures that were consistent with analysts’ forecasts and with the earnings supposedly followed
by investors. This change in the calculation of earnings by I/B/E/S is relevant to research on
intertemporal changes in analyst bias or optimism, and is discussed later.
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4.2 LONG WINDOW EARNINGS-RETURNS ASSOCIATION TESTS
The evidence in figure 1 raises the issue of which definition of earn-
ings capital market participants are paying attention to, the GAAP earnings
figure or the Street earnings figure? To establish the degree to which the
market is impounding each definition of earnings in prices, we investigate
long window associations between stock returns and each definition of earn-
ings. If the market finds Street earnings to be a better summary measure
of performance, contemporaneous returns will be more highly correlated
with EPSStreet than with EPSGAAP.
In univariate analyses (not reported), we find that Street forecast errors
are more highly correlated with stock returns than are GAAP forecast errors,
which may not be surprising because we have shown that Street earnings
exclude special items that are generally regarded as transitory. The following
stock returns tests highlight the impact our findings may have on other
results reported in the literature. We investigate whether the differences in
the two definitions of forecast error have significantly different explanatory
power with respect to long window stock returns across time, followed by a
brief discussion of implications for recent studies on changes in the value
relevance of accounting numbers.
Table 1 presents the results of regressions of long window returns on fore-
cast errors. The regression is estimated separately for EPSStreet and EPSGAAP
T A B L E 1
The Association Between Long Window Stock Returns and Street-based and GAAP-based Forecast Errors,
1985–1997 (n = 98,647 firm-quarters, t-statistics and (p-values) under coefficient estimates)
Return = α0 + α1POST92 + α2FEStreet + α3FEStreet ∗ POST92
+ α4FEGAAP + α5FEGAAP ∗ POST92 + ε
FEStreet ∗ FEGAAP ∗
Model Intercept POST92 FEStreet POST92 FEGAAP POST92 Adj. R2
1 0.043 0.008 0.567 1.248 — — 0.0241
36.9 5.0 23.8 25.7
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
2 0.044 0.008 — — 0.551 0.406 0.0204
37.3 5.3 24.7 12.0
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
3 0.044 0.008 0.319 1.027 0.358 0.081 0.0273
37.9 5.1 10.2 16.2 12.2 1.8
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0667)
H0: FEStreet = FEGAAP, F-statistic = 0.52, p-value = 0.4691
H0: FEStreet + FEStreet ∗ POST92 = FEGAAP + FEGAAP∗ POST92,
F-statistic = 127.32, p-value = 0.0001
Long window stock returns are buy-and-hold returns from two days after the last quarterly earnings an-
nouncement and through the day after the current period earnings announcement, where the announce-
ment date is obtained from the Compustat quarterly research tape. Forecast errors are defined as reported
earnings per share (either Street or GAAP) minus the median consensus earnings per share forecast for the
final month of the fiscal quarter, scaled by stock price. GAAP earnings are obtained from Compustat and are
defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (item #25) divided by average
common shares outstanding (item #61) adjusted for stock splits (item #17). Street earnings are obtained
from I/B/E/S and reflect GAAP earnings per share adjusted for certain charges considered by I/B/E/S to be
nonrecurring. Stock price is obtained from I/B/E/S as of the final month of the firm’s fiscal quarter end.
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forecast errors, and for both forecast error metrics together. The purpose
of the last specification is to allow a test of differences in the coefficients be-
tween the two forecast error definitions. The evidence in figure 1 indicates
a clear rift between Street and GAAP earnings beginning in the early 1990s.
Conversations with I/B/E/S confirm that this break point corresponds to the
time during which they began actively redefining “actual” earnings to ex-
clude certain items. We allow the coefficient on forecast errors to vary across
these two regimes. This is accomplished by including a time-period dummy
variable, POST92, which takes the value of 1 if the observation is from 1992
or later and 0 otherwise. If there has been no change in investors’ pricing of
forecast errors across time, the coefficient on the interaction term should
be zero. A significant positive coefficient indicates that investors view the
earnings measure (either EPSStreet or EPSGAAP) to be more value relevant in
the second half of the sample period.
In the separate forecast error regressions reported in table 1, both def-
initions of forecast error are positively related to long window returns,
which is not surprising given the correlation between the two forecast er-
ror definitions of 0.78 (not reported). The explanatory power, however, is
significantly greater in the EPSStreet forecast error regressions (Vuong test
p-value = 0.0063, not reported), suggestive of investor focus on the Street’s
earnings number. Indeed, many Wall Street observers have suggested this
result in the financial press, including Lehman Brothers accounting expert
Robert Willens, who stated “My experience with investors is that they tend
to pay more attention to pro forma than they do to GAAP net income.”15
In the regression including both definitions of forecast error, the coeffi-
cient on GAAP forecast errors (0.319) is statistically indistinguishable from
that on Street forecast errors (0.358). An F-test cannot reject the null of
equality for the two coefficient estimates, p-value = 0.4691. This result sug-
gests that in the pre-1992 portion of our sample period, investors do not
reveal a strong preference for one measure over the other. Turning to the
post-1992 portion of the sample period, however, we see that the coefficient
estimates on the time-period interaction terms are significant for both fore-
cast error definitions, consistent with stock returns having become more
strongly associated with forecast errors (based on both Street and GAAP
earnings) in the latter half of the sample period. However, the coefficient
on the interaction terms in the Street forecast error regression is 1.027 rel-
ative to 0.081 for the GAAP forecast error regression. An F-test reveals that
the difference between the combined forecast error coefficients is signifi-
cant (e.g., α2 + α3 > α4 + α5, p-value 0.0001). Thus, overall it appears that
investors are displaying an increasing preference for EPSStreet over EPSGAAP,
despite the fact that EPSStreet excludes an increasing proportion of expenses
required under GAAP.
15 See B. Alpert, “The Numbers Game: Reporting of Pro Forma Earnings Is Rising, and So
Is the Debate About It,” Barron’s, September 11, 2000.
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Several recent papers focusing exclusively on GAAP earnings conclude
that there has been a decline over time in the value relevance of accounting
earnings (Collins, Maydew, and Weiss [1997], Francis and Schipper [1999],
Chang [1999]). The evidence in this paper raises the question of how in-
ferences in those papers might differ if the focus was on earnings followed
by the Street rather than earnings under GAAP. We provide preliminary
evidence on this question based on quarterly regressions of long window
stock returns on quarterly earnings per share. The time-series of estimated
earnings response coefficients and R2 for EPSGAAP and EPSStreet are plotted
in figure 2.16
In panel A, the magnitude of the estimated earnings response coefficient
gradually rises for GAAP earnings but increases sharply for Street earnings.
This is consistent with the returns analyses discussed above. What is more
striking is the plot of quarterly R2 in panel B. R2s from the regression on
GAAP-based forecast errors are actually slightly higher than those using
Street-based forecast errors until 1992. Around this time, the plots cross,
and thereafter the R2 using Street earnings rises to approximately 0.06
while the R2 using GAAP earnings declines to approximately 0.03.17 After
documenting a decline in the ability of earnings to explain returns over
the 1952–1994 period, Francis and Schipper [1999] encourage future work
that examines the source of changes in the value relevance of earnings. Our
findings contribute to this line of work by suggesting that one explanation
appears to be that investors have increased their relative focus on Street
versus GAAP earnings.
4.3 EARNINGS GROWTH CALCULATIONS AND TRENDS
IN REPORTED EARNINGS
In this section, we provide formal statistical tests of time-series trends in
the difference between EPSStreet and EPSGAAP. Because EPSStreet has grown
larger relative to EPSGAAP, growth rates based on EPSStreet may be distorted.
In table 2, we investigate whether this is the case by tabulating the mean and
median annual earnings growth rates based on the two different definitions
of earnings. We calculate growth as (EPSt−EPSt−1)/EPSt−1 whenever EPSt−1
is positive. To minimize the influence of extreme growth due to a small
denominator problem, we winsorize each growth observation at ±1. Table 2
presents cross-sectional means and medians for growth computed using the
two alternative earnings definitions.
The first row of table 2 is based on all observations pooled cross-sectionally
across all years. The mean (median) earnings growth for the sample is
16 A recent paper by Brown, Lo, and Lys [1999] concludes that researchers should be cau-
tious when making inferences regarding the value relevance of accounting numbers based on
R2. The per share data we use is subject to a scale factor similar to the one they investigate.
However, we do not believe this substantially limits our inferences because any scale factor
should affect the R2 of both the GAAP and Street regressions similarly.
17 In the latter half of the sample period, quarterly differences in the explanatory power of
Street versus GAAP earnings are significant based on Vuong tests.
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GAAP earnings are obtained from Compustat and are defined as earnings before extraordinary
items and discontinued operations (data item #25) divided by average common shares out-
standing (data item #61) adjusted for stock splits (data item #17). Street earnings are obtained
from I/B/E/S and reflect GAAP earnings per share adjusted for certain charges considered
by I/B/E/S to be nonrecurring. Both earnings per share numbers are scaled by stock price,
obtained from I/B/E/S as of the final month of the firm’s fiscal quarter end. Raw stock returns
are obtained from CRSP and are measured beginning two days after the last quarterly earn-
ings announcement and ending on the day after the current period earnings announcement,
where the announcement date is obtained from the Compustat quarterly research tape. The
plot presents two-year moving averages for the earnings response coefficients and R2s.
FIG. 2.—Time-series plots of earnings response coefficients and R2s from quarterly cross-
sectional regressions of long window quarterly stock returns on Street and GAAP earnings per
share, 1985–1997.
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T A B L E 2
Mean and Median Percentage Growth in Earnings Per Share for Street and GAAP Earnings
Per Share, 1986–1997
% Growth in Earnings Per Share
Mean Median
Street GAAP p-value Street GAAP p-value
All years 7.1 4.9 0.0001 11.1 9.5 0.0001
By Quarter
1 7.6 6.7 0.1212 10.5 9.6 0.0466
2 6.8 5.4 0.0135 10.9 9.5 0.0008
3 7.6 5.5 0.0003 11.1 9.7 0.0007
4 6.5 2.2 0.0001 11.1 9.1 0.0001
By year
1986 −3.8 −1.1 0.0346 2.2 3.5 0.1870
1987 6.4 7.1 0.5902 10.5 10.0 0.6651
1988 14.1 13.5 0.6680 16.1 15.1 0.2949
1989 0.2 0.5 0.7754 5.7 6.1 0.6248
1990 −4.9 −5.7 0.4407 0.0 1.0 0.0663
1991 −5.3 −6.2 0.4270 0.0 0.0 0.5448
1992 8.5 7.5 0.3747 11.1 10.9 0.4918
1993 10.4 7.7 0.0048 12.1 11.3 0.2145
1994 14.5 10.9 0.0001 15.2 13.9 0.0524
1995 11.5 6.9 0.0001 13.7 11.4 0.0001
1996 10.0 6.1 0.0001 13.8 11.9 0.0004
1997 10.2 6.4 0.0001 13.8 12.1 0.0007
Earnings growth is calculated for both Street and GAAP earnings per share (EPS) as (EPSt−EPSt−1)/
EPSt−1 whenever EPSt−1 is positive and is winsorized at +/−1. GAAP earnings are obtained from Compustat
and are defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (item #25) divided
by average common shares outstanding (item #61) adjusted for stock splits (item #17). Street earnings are
obtained from I/B/E/S and reflect GAAP earnings per share adjusted for certain charges considered by
I/B/E/S to be nonrecurring. The p-values for the mean percentage growth figures are based on a two-
sided t-test for differences of means. The p-values for the median percentage growth figures are based on a
Z-statistic for a 2-sample test of medians.
7.1% (11.1%) based on EPSStreet and 4.9% (9.5%) based on EPSGAAP.
The mean and median differences are both highly statistically significant.
Turning to the middle section of table 2, we present growth statistics
by fiscal quarter. With the exception of quarter 1, growth calculations
based on EPSStreet are statistically larger than those based on EPSGAAP.
The difference is especially pronounced in the fourth quarter,
where the mean growth based on EPSStreet is approximately three times
that calculated based on EPSGAAP. The last section of the table shows
the pattern in growth calculations across years. Note that the growth statistics
based on the alternative definitions of earnings track each other reasonably
well up until 1993, when the divergence becomes noticeable and is statisti-
cally significant based on test of means and medians.18
18 These results corroborate the use of 1992 as the break-point in the long window earnings-
returns association tests in the previous section.
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T A B L E 3
Time Trend Regressions of the Difference Between Street and GAAP Earnings, 1985–1997
(t-statistics and (p-values) under coefficient estimates)
DIFF = α0 + α1YEAR + ε
N Intercept YEAR R2
Quarter
1 24,470 −0.0004 0.0002 0.0004
−0.9 3.3
(0.3540) (0.0011)
2 27,688 −0.0014 0.0004 0.0018
−3.2 7.2
(0.0016) (0.0001)
3 28,214 −0.0004 0.0003 0.0011
−0.9 5.5
(0.3546) (0.0001)
4 28,492 0.0011 0.0006 0.0021
1.7 7.6
(0.0835) (0.0001)
All Quarters 108,864 −0.0000 0.0004 0.0014
−0.1 12.1
(0.8918) (0.0001)
DIFF is the difference between Street and GAAP earnings per share, scaled by stock price. GAAP earnings
are obtained from Compustat and are defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations (item #25) divided by average common shares outstanding (item #61) adjusted for stock splits
(item #17). Street earnings are obtained from I/B/E/S and reflect GAAP earnings per share adjusted for
certain charges considered by I/B/E/S to be nonrecurring. Stock price is obtained from I/B/E/S as of the
final month of a firm’s fiscal quarter end. YEAR is equal to the fiscal year minus 1985.
We define a variable DIFF = (EPSStreet−EPSGAAP)/Price. Table 3 presents
the results of regressions of DIFF on a time trend variable, YEAR, equal to
the fiscal year of the observation minus 1985. We estimate the regression
separately for each fiscal quarter. The intercept represents the average level
of the difference between Street and GAAP earnings in 1985, while the co-
efficient on YEAR represents the average annual increase in that difference.
With the exception of quarter 2, intercepts are close to zero, consistent with
figure 1. The coefficient on YEAR is positive and highly statistically signi-
ficant for each quarter, with coefficients ranging from 0.0002 in the first
quarter to 0.0006 in the fourth quarter. To gauge the economic significance
of these differences, consider the fourth quarter. In the fourth quarter,
table 3 indicates that DIFF is approximately 0.0083 in the most recent sam-
ple year (=0.0011 + 0.0006 ∗ (1997–1985)). For a firm with an annual P/E
ratio in the 20–25 range, reasonable for the period, a value for DIFF of
0.0083 implies EPSStreet exceeds the EPSGAAP by 17–21%. Thus, consistent
with our first prediction, the difference between Street and GAAP earnings
has been gradually growing over the last decade, and the magnitude of the
difference is economically significant.
4.4 CONTEMPORANEOUS TRENDS IN SPECIAL ITEMS
Compustat’s “special items” category captures a subset of the charges
that are routinely excluded from EPSStreet. Thus, the increasing rift
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Special items (data item #32) and total operating expenses, defined as the difference between
sales (data item #2) and pretax income (data item #23), are obtained from the Compustat
quarterly research tapes.
FIG. 3.—Quarterly time-series plots of cross-sectional means of special items as a percentage
of total operating expenses, 1985–1997.
between EPSStreet and EPSGAAP is consistent with the increases in special
items reported in recent years (Elliott and Hanna [1996], Collins, Maydew,
and Weiss [1997]). In this subsection, we first provide an analysis of the
magnitude and frequency of special items over our sample period. We then
examine trends in the extent to which special items are excluded from
EPSStreet over our sample period.
Figure 3 presents the cross-sectional mean of special items (as a percent-
age of total operating expenses), and figure 4 shows the percentage of firms
recording positive or negative special items over the sample period. The fig-
ures demonstrate that the magnitude and frequency of special items have
continued increasing beyond the period studied in the papers referenced
above (e.g., through 1993–1994). For example, in recent years, figure 3 indi-
cates that mean special items range between 0.5% and 1% of total operating
expenses for the first through third quarters, and around 2% of total op-
erating expenses for the fourth quarter, all in excess of the levels in 1994.
More striking, figure 4 indicates that by 1997, approximately 1 in 10 firms
recorded a negative special item in each of the first three fiscal quarters,
and over 1 in 5 firms recorded negative special items in the fourth quarter.
In unreported time-trend regressions, the patterns evident in figures 3 and
4 are statistically significant. Overall, the figures suggest that firms’ use of
special items does not appear to be a temporary or stable phenomenon.
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Special items (data item #32) are obtained from the Compustat quarterly research tapes.
FIG. 4.—Quarterly time-series plots of percentages of firms recording positive and negative
special items, 1985–1997.
4.5 LINKING RECENT TRENDS IN SPECIAL ITEMS TO THE INCREASING
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STREET AND GAAP EARNINGS
To specifically link the trends in special items and differences in Street
and GAAP earnings noted above, we investigate differences in earnings par-
titioned by the sign of special items. In table 4, we measure the extent to
which special items are excluded from EPSStreet by regressing the differences
(DIFF) on special items (SI) and an interaction term between special items
and the variable YEAR. To interpret the coefficients, note differences be-
tween Street earnings and GAAP earnings are after-tax, but special items
are stated on a pre-tax basis. Assuming a tax rate of approximately 35%,
the expected coefficient on special items is negative 0.65 if I/B/E/S has
excluded all special items from EPSStreet (and no other items).19 Further-
more, if the treatment of special items by I/B/E/S has been consistent over
the sample period, the coefficient on the interaction term should be zero.
This should be true regardless of the increase in special items documented
19 The predicted coefficient is negative because negative special items should accompany a
positive value for EPSStreet-EPSGAAP.
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T A B L E 4
Tests for the Ability of Special Items to Explain Differences Between Street and GAAP Earnings Per Share,
1985–1997 (t-statistics and (p-values) under coefficient estimates)
DIFF = α0 + α1SI + α2YEAR + α3SI ∗ YEAR + ε
N Intercept SI YEAR SI ∗ YEAR Adj. R2
Quarter
1 24,470 −0.000 −0.066 0.0000 −0.057 0.0888
−0.0 −1.7 1.0 −13.5
(0.9889) (0.0937) (0.3152) (0.0001)
2 27,688 −0.002 −0.496 0.0003 −0.011 0.1789
−4.8 −32.3 6.2 −5.9
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
3 28,214 −0.000 −0.242 0.0001 −0.047 0.2941
−0.9 −16.0 1.5 −26.4
(0.3684) (0.0001) (0.1432) (0.0001)
4 28,492 −0.000 −0.336 0.0002 −0.037 0.3214
−0.8 −30.0 2.9 −26.7
(0.4306) (0.0001) (0.0027) (0.0001)
All Quarters 108,864 −0.001 −0.345 0.0002 −0.034 0.2564
−2.4 −49.2 5.9 −40.3
(0.0175) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
DIFF is the difference between Street and GAAP earnings per share, scaled by stock price. GAAP earnings
are obtained from Compustat and are defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations (item #25) divided by average common shares outstanding (item #61) adjusted for stock splits
(item #17). Street earnings are obtained from I/B/E/S and reflect GAAP earnings per share adjusted for
certain charges considered by I/B/E/S to be nonrecurring. Stock price is obtained from I/B/E/S as of the
final month of a firm’s fiscal quarter end. YEAR is equal to the fiscal year minus 1985.
above. However, as noted in section 3, there are numerous other charges
that we do not specifically consider, and to the extent there are other charges
excluded by I/B/E/S but not captured within Compustat “special items,” the
coefficient estimate will be biased towards zero and the explanatory power
of the regression will be reduced.20
The results in table 4 are consistent our predictions. First, the coefficient
on special items is negative in all four fiscal quarters. This indicates that
I/B/E/S has filtered some special items from earnings as far back as 1985.
More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term is also consistently
negative and significant, indicating that I/B/E/S has gradually excluded an
increasing proportion of special items from the Street definition of earnings.
This result is consistent with our third prediction. The tendency to exclude
special items from Street earnings is greater now than in the past. To gauge
the economic significance of these results, in the last year of the sample
it appears that, on average, the difference between fourth quarter I/B/E/S
and Compustat earnings is approximately 78% of special items (≈|−0.336 +
(1997-1985) ∗ (0.0002 − 0.037)|). Thus, it appears that I/B/E/S is indeed
20 Philbrick and Ricks [1991] examine detailed financial statements for the 60 firm-quarter
observations in their sample with the largest differences between Compustat and Value Line
earnings per share, and find that in 57 cases, the differences were due to write-offs or similar
charges that were not coded as “special items” by Compustat.
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excluding special items from their definition of earnings, as they claim, but
that the treatment has not been consistent across years.
Although the adjusted R2s of the regressions in table 4 are relatively high,
these simple regressions surely omit a number of other factors that also
contribute to the variation in differences in the two earnings definitions.
Thus, we emphasize that although these results are based on special items,
the trend in the exclusion of special items is likely generalizable to other
excluded costs. In unreported analyses, we estimate the regression of differ-
ences between Street and GAAP earnings on special items and time trend
variables using annual data, for which Compustat provides more refined in-
formation on “other charges.” In addition to special items, we also include
amortization expense, research and development expense, and nonoperat-
ing income as explanatory variables in the regressions. In addition to the
importance of special items, we find that differences between Street and
GAAP earnings are also explained by all three of these additional charges,
although the incremental explanatory power is moderate. Moreover, we
find that for amortization expense, the coefficient on the interaction term
is statistically significant. Thus, similar to the exclusion of special items by
the Street, it appears that the exclusion of amortization expense from earn-
ings followed by the Street has also been gaining popularity, consistent with
anecdotal evidence.
4.6 ANALYSIS OF TEMPORAL CHANGES IN ALTERNATIVELY DEFINED
FORECAST ERRORS
The above analyses suggest that inferences in research that uses I/B/E/S
actuals when computing forecast errors may be contaminated by the chang-
ing treatment of certain GAAP expenses by analyst databases over time. For
example, recent studies suggest that analysts have become less optimistic in
their forecasts of earnings in recent years (e.g., Matsumoto [2000], Brown
[2001]). To the extent that the tracking services have redefined the “actual”
earnings upon which forecast errors are calculated, those studies may reflect
the changing definition of Street earnings. To provide evidence on this pos-
sibility, we investigate the characteristics of forecast errors computed using
both EPSStreet and EPSGAAP.
Figure 5 presents forecast errors by the sign of special items and defi-
nition of realized earnings. In both panels of figure 5, it is evident that
when a firm records a negative special item, the forecast is optimistic (i.e.,
forecast error is negative) regardless of realized earnings definition. More-
over, both definitions of forecast errors reveal some attenuation of negative
forecast errors over the sample period. However, the decline in optimism
is sharply pronounced when forecast errors are defined relative to EPSStreet
(panel B).
Matsumoto [2000] also finds an attenuation of negative forecast er-
rors over time. However, she interprets the decline in optimism as evi-
dence of management’s downward guidance of analysts’ forecasts such that
management can report earnings that meet or beat the analysts’ forecasts.
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Forecast errors are defined as reported earnings per share (either Street or GAAP) minus the
median consensus earnings per share forecast for the final month of the fiscal quarter, scaled
by stock price. GAAP earnings are obtained from Compustat and are defined as earnings before
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (item #25) divided by average common shares
outstanding (item #61) adjusted for stock splits (item #17). Street earnings are obtained from
I/B/E/S and reflect GAAP earnings per share adjusted for certain charges considered by I/B/E/S
to be nonrecurring. Stock price is obtained from I/B/E/S as of the final month of the firm’s
fiscal quarter end. Special items (data item #32) are obtained from the Compustat quarterly
research tapes.
FIG. 5.—Time-series plots of mean street-based and GAAP-based forecast errors as a percent-
age of stock price, partitioned by the sign of special items, 1985–1997.
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In her study, the forecast error is computed relative to the earnings provided
by Zacks, similar to our EPSStreet computation. An alternative interpretation,
suggested by our results, is that the decline in optimism is due to an over-
time increase in the earnings per share reported by the analyst tracking service (as
they have gradually removed certain items), rather than downward pressure
from management on forecasted earnings per share. We are inclined to be-
lieve that the documented decline in optimism reflects both phenomena.
Thus, we interpret the collective evidence as complementary, rather than
mutually exclusive and argue that the documented decline in analysts’ fore-
cast optimism is due, at least in part, to a redefining of Street earnings over
the past decade.
4.7 ORIGINATION OF THE EMPHASIS ON STREET EARNINGS
Anecdotally, it appears that the redefining of earnings is originating with
firm managers. However, an alternative is that the analysts and/or the an-
alyst tracking services are increasingly taking it upon themselves to remove
certain charges from reported earnings. To investigate this issue further,
we examine a sample of earnings announcement disclosures. The disclo-
sures are obtained from newswires, which contain press releases prepared
by firm managers. We limit our analysis to observations where Street earn-
ings exceed GAAP earnings. Thus, we are asking the question, conditional
on Street earnings exceeding GAAP earnings, does management empha-
size the Street number over the GAAP number? If so, we expect to find
an increase in the frequency with which managers discuss Street earnings
and a relative displacement of the discussion of GAAP earnings within the
announcement.
The sample is selected from two early years of our sample period (1986–
1987) and the two years immediately following our sample period (1998–
1999). From each of these periods, we randomly select 50 earnings an-
nouncements per fiscal quarter in each of the two subperiods from the
set of announcements for which EPSStreet > EPSGAAP, yielding 400 total an-
nouncements. We obtain the 400 corresponding earnings announcement
press releases from the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service. We code which
earnings number is discussed first, the paragraph in which it is discussed
(PRESENT1 = 1 if presented in paragraph 1, PRESENT1 = 2 if discussed in
paragraph 2, etc.), and likewise for the earnings number discussed second
(PRESENT2), when applicable.
Panel A of table 5 tabulates the frequency of combinations of Street and
GAAP earnings discussed by managers in each time period. Three items
are noteworthy. First, approximately 83 percent (n = 165) of the earnings
announcements from the 1986–1987 period discussed GAAP earnings only,
while just 28 percent (n = 56) of the earnings announcements for the 1998–
1999 period discussed GAAP earnings only (difference significant at <0.001
level). Second, there is a large increase in the number of earnings an-
nouncements that discuss dual measures of earnings. Whereas 18 percent
(n = 22 + 13) of the earnings announcements from the earlier period
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T A B L E 5
Analysis of 400 Corporate Earnings Announcements for Evidence of a Change in Preference Between
Discussing Street and GAAP Earnings for Two Subperiods, 1986–1987 and 1998–1999
Order of earnings per share presentation
GAAP then Street then
Period GAAP only Street GAAP Street only All
Panel A: Tabulation of frequencies of combinations of earnings per share numbers discussed
1986–1987 165 22 13 0 200
(82.5%) (11.0%) (6.5%) (0.0%) (100%)
1998–1999 57 56 84 3 200
(28.5%) (28.0%) (42.0%) (1.5%) (100%)
Total 222 78 97 3 400
Z-statistic 20.1∗∗ 7.7∗∗ 20.4∗∗ — —
χ2 — — — — 122.3∗∗
Panel B: Mean Paragraph in which GAAP and Street earnings per share are presented first
1986–1987
PRESENT1 2.2 2.5 1.5 — 2.2
PRESENT2 — 3.4 2.3 — 3.0
Spread — 0.9∗ 0.8 —
t-test for differences 0.0
1998–1999
PRESENT1 2.7 2.2 1.9 3.3 2.2
PRESENT2 — 2.7 4.0 — 3.4
Spread — 0.5 2.1∗ —
t-test for differences 3.8∗∗
Fifty earnings announcements for each of the first through fourth quarters in each subperiod are obtained
from Dow Jones News Retrieval Service. PRESENT1 (PRESENT2) is the paragraph in which the first (second,
when applicable) earnings per share figure is discussed. t-tests are 2-tailed. Z-tests are based on binomial
tests of differences in instances for the 1998–1999 subperiod, except for the “Street Only” instance for which
the zero instances in the 1986–1987 make this test invalid.
∗ Denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
∗∗ Denotes significance at the 0.001 level.
discuss both Street and GAAP earnings, 70 percent (n = 56 + 84) of the
earnings announcements from the later period discuss both definitions (dif-
ference significant at <0.001 level, not tabulated). Finally, conditional on
discussing both Street and GAAP earnings, there is a marked change in the
order in which managers discuss both measures of earnings. In the earlier
period, GAAP is discussed prior to Street earnings in 22 of 35 (63%) such
announcements. In the later period, the tendency to first disclose GAAP
earnings reverses and managers discuss Street earnings before GAAP earn-
ings in 84 of 140 (60%) of such announcements (difference significant at
<0.001 level). Overall, a chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis that the
composition of earnings per share presentation is the same across the two
periods (p-value <0.001).
The evidence in panel A suggests that managers have stepped up their ef-
forts to highlight Street earnings relative to GAAP earnings, but does not give
an indication of the relative displacement of GAAP earnings within the an-
nouncements. Panel B of table 5 presents formal evidence on the ordering
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of earnings disclosures within earnings announcements. We tabulate the
means of PRESENT1 and PRESENT2. Most earnings figures are presented
in the first two or three paragraphs. In the 1986–1987 period, the mean para-
graph in which earnings are first discussed is 2.5 when GAAP is presented
first and 1.5 when Street is presented first. In this period, the spread in the
mean paragraph between the first and second earnings figure discussed is 0.9
(significant, based on two-tailed t-tests of the difference in paragraph num-
bers) when GAAP is presented first, and 0.8 (not significant) when Street
is presented first. However, the difference between these two spreads is not
significant, indicating that the ordering of GAAP and Street earnings when
both are presented reveals no systematic pattern for the earlier period. In
contrast, for 1998–1999, when Street earnings are presented first there is a
significant mean spread of 2.1 paragraphs (significant) between PRESENT1
and PRESENT2, and this spread is significantly larger than the spread of
0.5 paragraphs when GAAP precedes Street earnings.
Overall, the evidence indicates that in recent periods, managers empha-
size Street earnings earlier than GAAP earnings within press releases. Al-
though our tests cannot conclusively rule out the possibility that managers
are responding to pressures from analysts to partition earnings into perma-
nent and transitory components, we believe that the evidence we present
combined with our readings of earnings announcements and statements in
the financial press indicate that managers are proactive in the promotion
of Street earnings.
5. Conclusion and Implications
In this paper, we investigate two alternative definitions of accounting earn-
ings: earnings computed under GAAP and a modified Street version of ac-
counting earnings that excludes various items recorded under GAAP. For
the period 1986–1997, we document a marked increase in the exclusion of
significant expenses from the earnings reported by analyst tracking services,
and a corresponding increase in firms specifically identifying large portions
of their expenses as nonrecurring. This change in the reporting environ-
ment has resulted in a growing disparity between earnings under GAAP
and earnings followed by the Street. We also show that investors display an
increasing preference for the modified version of earnings reported by the
analyst tracking services as opposed to earnings as dictated by GAAP.
Our findings are important to the interpretation of other research in the
literature. To the extent that managers have been successful in persuading
analysts and investors to ignore certain charges and these are reflected in
research databases, the decline in analysts’ optimism documented in recent
research is due, at least in part, to the redefining of Street earnings rather
than management guidance of analysts’ forecasts. In this respect, our find-
ings are relevant to any research that draws inferences based on a time-series
of forecast errors. Additionally, we present evidence pertinent to prior re-
search on changes in the value relevance of earnings over time. We find that
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both the earnings response coefficient and regression R2s increase signifi-
cantly for Street earnings. This suggests that although the value relevance
of reported earnings may have declined relative to book values (Collins,
Maydew, and Weiss [1997]), the value relevance of Street earnings appears
to have increased significantly.
A long history of research investigates the ability of managers to manipu-
late or manage earnings. Our results have implications for this work if the
phenomenon we document reflects opportunistic behavior by managers
rather than rational screening of transitory items by investors. Although the
analysis here focuses exclusively on differences in earnings due to items
flagged by Compustat as “special items,” recent trends in financial report-
ing suggest that managers and analysts are extending the list of “ignored”
expenses to include other expenses. For example, there is a recent and
growing trend in the reporting of “cash earnings,” equal to earnings ad-
justed upwards to exclude goodwill amortization.21 Our results suggest that
investors currently appear to be willing to accept these modified definitions
of earnings. Moreover, preliminary findings discussed in section 4.5 suggest
that our results are generalizable beyond special items, but that future work
in this area is warranted.
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